'There's something called deterrence by punishment.'
'That means you hit in a manner calculated to raise costs and consequences for Pakistan, so that the next time it attempts a Pahalgam-like attack, it has to think ten times.'
On the night of May 6-7, 2025, India launched Operation Sindoor, a multi-domain military strike deep into Pakistan territory.
Designed as a retaliatory action to the brutal murder of 26 tourists in Pahalgam on April 22, 2025, this operation marked a significant escalation in India's military doctrine.
Unlike previous missions such as the 2016 Uri surgical strike or the 2019 Balakot airstrike, Operation Sindoor represents a shift in strategic intent, operational scope, and target visibility, says Major General G D Bakshi (retd), the Indian Army veteran known for his clarity on military doctrine and national security.
In a two-part, wide-ranging interview with Rediff's Prasanna D Zore, General Bakshi offers a deeply informed assessment of India's evolving doctrine -- from 'deterrence by denial' to 'deterrence by punishment.'
How is Operation Sindoor different from the Balakot air strike in terms of messaging, target selection and intensity?
Both the surgical strike post-Uri and Balakot were strategic messaging exercises. These involved single services and targeted what you know, were not very high-profile targets -- terror targets.
In the first instance, in 2016, it was the terror launch pads, two to three kms deep inside, and 40 were killed. For about a year or so, Pakistan was quiet. Then it started its terror shenanigans again.
In 2019, they struck in Pulwama, killing 40 CRPF troopers with an IED. And then we retaliated with an airstrike using the Mirage 2000. We went 80 km inside (Pakistan), hit a remote camp, and killed about 200.
The problem with these strategic messaging exercises was that their deterrent effect lasted at best for a year or two, and then it was back to business as usual. The targets selected were not very high-profile, so the impact was not so visible.
This time, we haven't really engaged in strategic messaging, but we have targeted nine locations, and there have been about 24 strikes on these nine targets using BrahMos cruise missiles, Rafale jets armed with SPICE-2000 and HAMMER (Highly Agile Modular Munition Extended Range) precision-guided munitions, and the army's Smerch and possibly Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launchers, as well as loitering munitions (kamikaze drones) -- the combination that we have used. And these are more for deterrent effect.
You know, there's something called deterrence by punishment. That means you hit in a manner calculated to raise costs and consequences for Pakistan, so that the next time it attempts a Pahalgam-like attack, it has to think ten times before being deterred. That is the issue.
So, the difference between the two is, of course, in the scale of the operation, in the target set, and in the visibility of the targets.
Also, between 2019 and 2025, the Indian Air Force has become much stronger. In terms of equipment profile, we have the S-400 Triumf surface-to-air Russian missiles, which are the best in their class globally, with a range of 600 kms to detect and track, and a range of 400 kms to shoot down.
That means you can almost shoot down Pakistani planes as they take off from their own airfields in Pakistan. Then we have the Rafales, which we did not have in 2019. We have beyond visual range missiles, not just the Meteor on the Rafales, but also the Astra 1 and Astra 2 on the Sukhois.
So, with these, we are in a much stronger position to inflict punishment (on Pakistan and terrorists' hideouts in Pakistan).
The good news is that today we have managed to achieve surprise. Despite the two weeks of notice, we have managed to achieve surprise. We have managed to achieve deception because we were conducting an air exercise in Rajasthan when we struck in the north. So, we achieved deception about the timeframe.
We spread the narrative that, 'Oh, it could take six months, eight months, and don't be in a hurry.' So, they relaxed a bit, and we hit them and took them by surprise. We've been able to penetrate their air defences.
The Pakistan prime minister said about four to five -- initially it was two, then it was four, now it is five -- (Indian fighter planes) were shot down. There is absolutely no proof of even an Indian aircraft being scratched because they never fired from inside Pakistani airspace; they didn't even cross (the Line of Control/the international border).
So, the joke about aircraft being shot down is a bit hard to swallow. It has been a very successful strike. It has been a high-visibility strike.
We have gone in the first wave of attack, which has happened now, and we've targeted only terror camps and terror headquarters. This is a proportionate response. You (Pakistan) conducted a terror strike (Pahalgam), and we have hit your terror camps.
It is a proportionate response, a calibrated response designed to reduce the chances of escalation.
Was there deliberate restraint in the operation to avoid civilian and military casualties and manage escalation?
Yes, yes. Quite obviously, it was designed into the framework of this operation. Built into the framework of this operation: No military targets, minimal civilian collateral damage. But now the question is, where do we go from here?
What were India's key strategic objectives in launching Operation Sindoor? Was it retaliation, deterrence, or a doctrinal shift? Do you think any of these has been achieved by what India did?
My take is that this is just the first strike. And we have given Pakistan an off-ramp: If you want to get off here, well and good.
If Pakistan hits back, targeting our military assets or our civilian populations, then India is free to escalate and strike Pakistani military ISI targets, armed forces targets, and inflict deterrent costs and punishment.
If you just eliminate terrorists alone, I'm afraid the deterrent effect is not that significant because the actual perpetrators, the masterminds of terror, are the Pakistan army and the ISI.
If you don't damage them, don't even scratch them, don't do anything to them, well, the deterrent effect is not going to be long-lasting.
It (the Indian attack on terrorist hideouts) may be slightly more effective than Balakot, but it will very likely revert to business as usual.
One needs to employ double-echelon thinking. Double-echelon thinking is, 'I'll do this. He will react in this way. That will give me a chance to do this.' That is double-echelon thinking.
When you are ascending an escalation ladder, you have to anticipate three or four moves ahead, like a chess game. You anticipate the enemy's moves. You have already considered your counter-move, and then what they will do, and your subsequent counter-move is already prepared. You unleash them, you trigger these responses by giving them that initial push.
My take would be that if we really want to impose deterrence by punishment, meaning raise costs and consequences for Pakistan, then we will have to go at least two or three steps up the escalation ladder.
It can't be like Balakot, where we struck once, they retaliated the next day, and everything calmed down, and we were desperate to somehow disengage and not escalate further. That kind of thing, I'm sorry to say, overall gave you a 50-50 outcome. You know, this is how foreign countries assessed that encounter -- as 50-50.
Pakistan came out feeling quite good, and it emboldened Pakistan rather than dampening their spirits, although it did worry them for a time.
For two years, they were relatively quiet, during which time we did away with Article 370 and Article 35A. But beyond that, the deterrence wore off, and Pakistan, because it was able to shoot down a MiG-21, was able to claim that they retaliated, that they gave it back to a much bigger, larger India, and they sort of called our bluff, so to speak. You can't repeat that.
If you're not prepared to go two or three steps up the escalation ladder, don't start. Don't start now. You have started, so you should be prepared. We are. We have given Pakistan an off-ramp. If you want to call it off now and you don't want to repeat it, give us an assurance, and that's okay.
The defence ministry in Pakistan has waved a white flag, saying that if India does this, we will de-escalate... How do you read this peace overture?
But you can't be sure of their intentions. You can't trust whether they are using deception to lull you before they strike. What then?
The simple thing, as I see it, is that Pakistan's (army chief General) Asim Munir is in a precarious position now. He started this whole spectacle with that civilisational war speech, a clash of civilisations between Hindu and Muslim civilisations.
That was followed by the communal strike in Pahalgam, where they asked people their religion and shot them in cold blood at point-blank range, in front of their relatives. It was horrific. It boiled the blood of the nation, and there was no way the (Narendra) Modi government could have avoided a kinetic response.
- Part 2 of the Interview: Operation Sindoor: 'Don't Mess With India'
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